Microfinance In The Philippines: An Assessment of Viability, Sustainability and Outreach among Grameen Replicators by Seibel, Hans Dieter et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Seibel, Hans Dieter; Llanto, Gilberto M.; Garcia, Edgardo; Callanta, Ruth
Working Paper
Microfinance In The Philippines: An Assessment
of Viability, Sustainability and Outreach among
Grameen Replicators
Working paper / University of Cologne, Development Research Center, No. 1997,4
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität zu Köln
Suggested citation: Seibel, Hans Dieter; Llanto, Gilberto M.; Garcia, Edgardo; Callanta,
Ruth (1997) : Microfinance In The Philippines: An Assessment of Viability, Sustainability and
Outreach among Grameen Replicators, Working paper / University of Cologne, Development




Working Paper No. 1997-4
Hans Dieter Seibel, Gilberto M. Llanto,
Edgardo Garcia & Ruth Callanta
MICROFINANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
An Assessment of Viability, Sustainability and Outreach among
Grameen Replicators
                                                                                                                                                                     
Universität zu Köln   University of Cologne
Arbeitsstelle für Entwicklungsländerforschung Development Research Center
Bernhard-Feilchenfeld-Str. 11, 50969 Köln Bernhard-Feilchenfeld-Str. 11, D-50969 Cologne
Tel.: 0221-470.4078, Fax: 0221: 0221-470.5195 Tel.:
++49-221-470.4078, Fax: 
++49-221-470.5195
   seibel@uni-koeln.deAbstract
1
The Philippines, a country of great promise in the 1950s, has greatly lagged behind many other
Asian countries. Between 1991 and 1994 urban poverty declined from 26% to 29%; but rural
poverty virtually stagnated at a much higher rate: 55% and 54%, respectively. Poverty lending
programs were instituted in vast numbers, but undermined the viability of the institutions while
their impact remained insignificant. Large numbers of self-help groups and NGOs have been
trying to fill the void. Yet those institutions that focus on the poor lack the capacity for substantial
outreach to the poor, while those that possess the capacity lack the focus. Despite recent
liberalization efforts, policymakers in the Philippines, unlike those in Indonesia, have relied more
on government intervention and credit channeling than the self-reliant intermediation of market-
oriented microfinance institutions (MFIs). In the framework of a wider UNDP-supported program
of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre in Kuala Lumpur on Microfinance for the Poor in
Asia-Pacific, seven MFIs were selected from the Philippines and analyzed in terms of outreach to
the poor, resource mobilization, viability and sustainability: six credit NGOs and one cooperative
rural bank. All but one of them use the Grameen technology in reaching the poor, replicating
Prof. Yunus’s Grameen Bank model so highly successful in Bangladesh. All but one of the MFIs
were found subsidy-dependent and donor-driven, though they do adhere to the creed of market
rates of interest. Only the cooperative bank, which applies both the conventional individual and
the Grameen-type group-group technology and was is therefore analyzed in greater detail, was
found to be operationally and financially self-sufficient. Yet it showed little capacity for dynamic
growth. While its Grameen-type group technology was profitable and multiplied the bank's
outreach, it added so little to its overall profits that management considers its termination. One
recommendation stands out from the case studies: transform credit NGOs into formal financial
institutions that rely on their own internal resources and cover their costs from the margin! Stop
using them as credit channels!
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The Philippines, with a population of 70.3 million in 1995 (74 million in 1997) and a population
growth rate of 2.6%, was a country of great promise during the 1950s. Since then it has greatly
lagged behind a number of other Asian countries, both in terms of economic growth and poverty
alleviation. It is only within the last few years that hope for growth and development has returned
to the country.
After the crisis years under the Marcos regime, policy and structural reforms were initiated under
the Aquino and Ramos administration. This eventually put the economy back in the growth path.
Over the five-year period, 1991-1995, overall GNP growth averaged only 3.4% p.a. At the current
rate of population growth, this has meant that per capita income grew hardly at all. However,
there is a marked difference in growth between the first and the latter part of that time period.
During the first three years, GNP growth rates were 0.1%, 1.4% and 1.3%. Subsequently, in 1994
and 1995, they jumped to a new level of 5.3% and 5.7%, respectively. At the same time, the
government succeeded in keeping inflation under control, which was brought down from 18.7%
in 1991 to single digit figures fluctuating between 7.6% and 9.8% p.a. The value of the national
currency, the Peso, stabilized too, with a slight overall appreciation from P27.5 in 1991 to P25.7
to the US$ in 1995.
With the recovery of the economy from stagnation, a significant increase in real savings was
noted after 1993, particularly attributable to a growth in savings of the government and of
corporations. At the same time, deposit and lending rates stabilized starting in 1993. Lending
rates of commercial banks averaged at 15% p.a. in the last three years, down from weighted
averages of 23% and 19% in 1991 and 1992, respectively. At the same time nominal interest rates
on savings jumped from close to 5% in 1991 to an average around 8% in recent years but mostly
failed to exceed the inflation rate, yielding negative or near-zero real returns. Real returns on time
deposits were not much higher, averaging only about 1% p.a. during the last two years. This
seems to have affected the savings of households and unincorporated enterprises which not only
failed to increased but slowly declined in recent years.
In 1995 the formal financial system was strengthened by the creation of a new and more
autonomous central bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The central bank pursued the
financial reforms of the 1980s and increased banking competition by liberalizing bank entry and
branching-out. Recent news about the development of the financial sector and the economy as a
whole have been positive. The renewed vigor of the economy led the administration to announce
a strong focus on poverty alleviation in the framework of continued policy reforms.
                                                          
2  Exchange rates (US$ 1.00 = Pesos...): 1991   P27.48; 1992   P25.51; 1993   26.99; 1994   26.45; 1995   25.70.2
1.2. Poverty incidence
The overall incidence of poverty in the Philippines was 36% in 1994, down by four percentage
points from 40% in 1991. According to the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, the total
number of poor households has only slightly decreased: from 4.78 million to 4.56 million during
that period - almost fully matched by a corresponding growth of the population.
The largest number of poor is found in the rural agricultural sector, which is attributed by some to
a prevalence of large landholdings and a failed land reform. More than half the rural population
are poor, with little change in incidence rates: 55% in 1991 and 54% in 1994. The incidence of
rural poverty, about two-thirds, was highest among farming and fishing families. The decline in
urban poverty, which is somewhat below average, was more marked: from 36% in 1991 to 29%
in 1994.
In addition to the magnitude of poverty, the government has also to contend with the highly
inequitable distribution of income, which is slow in changing. Between 1991 and 1994, the Gini
index has negligibly declined from 0.468 to 0.454, indicating a slightly more equitable
distribution of income.
1.3. Poverty alleviation programs
Banks rarely lend to the poor. Since 1991, less than 12% of low-income families have borrowed,
nearly two-fifths of them from relatives and friends and one-third from private moneylenders and
cooperatives. NGOs provided only 2.9% of that credit in urban and 1.9% in rural areas.
Cooperatives and rural banks have a much wider outreach, but serve more the nonpoor than the
poor. To remedy this situation, the government has supported as many as 111 credit programs of
which 13 are targeted to the very poor. Among them are the NGO Microcredit Project of the
Department of Trade and Industry with 82,000 borrowers through almost 2,000 conduits
(3/1996); the Self-employment Assistance Program of the Social Welfare and Development
Department with over 45,000 clients; the Grameen Bank Replication Project of the Agricultural
Credit Policy Council, involving 23 NGOs, cooperatives and rural banks as replicators, with
13,500 beneficiaries (12/1994); and the Landbank's agricultural and rural credit channeling
program through rural banks and some 8,000 cooperatives. Experts agree that credit channeling
has greatly undermined the viability of these institutions. To divest itself of the task of lending to
the poor, Landbank has recently established a finance company, the People's Credit and Finance
Corporation, PCFC. The objective is to use PCFC for poverty lending so that Landbank may
concentrate on its original mandate of agricultural reform lending and its new mandate of
commercial lending to a growing agricultural sector. Prior to the creation of PCFC, the
government used the National Livelihood Support Fund, NLSF, under the Office of the President
to provide microcredit. In 1995, the NLSF provided credit lines to about 60 MFIs valued at P83
million (US$3.2 million). As of March 1996, P46 million has effectively been lent to 28 rural
banks and 10 cooperative rural banks. They in turn provided microloans not exceeding P25,000
(US$993) to 4,345 end-users. This figures clearly shows that such programs are more symbolic in
nature, with only insignificant outreach and impact.3
Table 1.1: Directed credit programs in the Philippines, 1995





No. of programs 39 13 21 38 111
No. of implemen-
ting agencies
19 4 12 9
Funds available in
billion Pesos
>11.06 n.a. >3.2 >16.7 >31
Interest p.a. 6-14% 0%; 6%; to
market rate
3-18% 7-24%
Source: National Credit Council
The Philippines are a country in which NGOs abound. According to the NEDA Monitoring
Study, it is estimated that there are over 30,000 NGOs and community-based People's
Organizations listed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This includes close to 7,000
Development NGOs and up to 500 credit NGOs with an average of 100-200 borrowers; fifty of
them are estimated to provide credit with a commercial orientation. Despite their large number,
their outreach remains limited, with the largest NGO serving not much more than 3,000
borrowers and savers. It is estimated that only 2% of the credit needs of poor borrowers are
actually covered.
1.4. Financial institutions and their outreach to the poor
On the whole, there is an estimated number of about 2,800 MFIs in the Philippines with a total
outreach of about 650,000 customers (table 1.2). Adding more than 1,000 rural shareholding
banks, with an average of 2,000 loan accounts and 6,000 savings deposit accounts, and private
development banks, total MFI outreach might exceed the one million mark. There are also some
8,000 agricultural cooperatives not included below which are used by Landbank as credit
channels. In addition, there are uncounted informal savings and credit associations, among them
the ubiquitous ROSCAs (paluwagan), which mobilize and circulate their own resources.4
Table 1.2: Estimated institutional outreach of MFIs in the Philippines.
MFI Number of MFIs Average outreach Total outreach
Development NGOs 150 150 2,500
Grameen Replicators 40 500 20,000
Mature credit NGOs 30 1,000 30,000
Immature credit NGOs 100 250 25,000
Cooperative rural banks 42 2,000 84,000
Credit cooperatives 1,500 300 450,000
People's organizations 500 50 25,000
Total 2,762 656,500
Source: R. Chua & G.M. Llanto, Assessing the Efficiency and Outreach of Microfinance
Schemes. ILO, 1995.
Despite all these efforts, the overall outreach to the poor has remained small. The credit programs
of the government were found costly and unsustainable, leading to gross inefficiencies, financial
market distortion and a weakening of private sector incentives to innovate. Credit NGOs have not
fared much better. They may have an almost exclusive focus on the poor. But they are hampered
by their weak institutional capacity, which largely appears beyond redemption   unless they turn
into proper financial institutions. Without a legal personality as a full-fledged financial
institution, the credit NGOs can neither raise sufficient equity nor tap deposits to sustain their
operations. Lending funds may be made available from many sources, but the weak absorptive
capacity of the NGOs is a binding constraint to a greater outreach. Some claim that only the rural
banks have the potential of truly reaching out to the poor, but would require thorough
familiarization with financial technologies of profitable banking with the poor. Some rural and
private development banks on Mindanao have successfully demonstrated that banking with the
poor is feasible.
The Philippine experience shows that those institutions that focus on the poor lack the capacity of
reaching the poor in large numbers; while those institutions that possess the capacity lack the
focus. It is quite clear that the effectiveness of NGOs banking with the poor could be greatly
enhanced through the adoption of a legal status providing the authority to act as real financial
intermediaries. However, given their small number, this will not solve the outreach problem. At
the same time, the capacity of credit NGOs to develop and offer innovative financial products
was found to be quite restricted. This is due to two major factors: their lack of competence in
product development; and their lack of appropriate legal status, which makes deposit
mobilization illegal.5
1.5. Policy and regulatory framework
The eradication of poverty is one of the major concerns of the Philippine government. The
Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty, PCFP, has identified five major strategies to bring the
incidence of poverty down to 30% in 1998:
· Promote and sustain economic growth at 5-7% p.a. to create employment and livelihood
opportunities;
· sustain growth strategies directly accessible to the poor, including labor-intensive industries,
adequate agricultural prices, and credit retailing of cooperatives and NGOs to farmers,
marginal borrowers and people's organizations at market rates, and the consolidation of
livelihood programs into a credit facility for the hardcore poor;
· expand basic social services;
· support income-generating community projects including skill and technology training, credit
and livelihood assistance, and extension services;
· enhance the capabilities of the poor to help themselves through people's organizations, NGOs
and local government.
Starting in the 1980s, a number of financial reforms have improved the policy environment in
which MFIs operate. Interest rate ceilings were removed; the interest rates of preferential credit
programs were aligned with market rates; bank entry and branching-out were liberalized;
competition in the domestic financial market was strengthened; and a stronger Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, BSP, replaced the former Central Bank of the Philippines. As a result, banks compete
in deposit taking, offering innovative products directed at different market segments. Similarly,
credit unions and cooperatives, which are under the supervision of the Cooperative Development
Authority, offer withdrawable and nonwithdrawable deposit products, particularly to small savers.
Recognizing the need to provide access to credit to the microeconomy, particularly smallholder
agriculture and the small and microenterprise sector, the government has put in place several
policies on credit allocation and deposit retention comprising the following interventions:
· requiring 75% of the deposits generated from a region to be invested in that area;
· mandating banks to allocate 25% of their net incremental loanable funds for agriculture, two-
fifths (10%) of which are to be lent to agrarian reform beneficiaries while three-fifths (15%)
are to be reserved for general agricultural lending;
· mandating all lending institutions to lend at least 10% of their total loan portfolio to small
enterprises with total assets up to a ceiling of P10 million;
· liberalizing bank branching regulations to bring banking services to a wider range of the
population;
· implementing various directed credit programs for the basic sectors.
On the whole, policymakers in the Philippines have relied more on government intervention and
credit channeling than the self-reliant intermediation of market-oriented MFIs. E.g., through
credit programs such as the DTI Microcredit Project, ACPC's Grameen Replication Project and
the NLSF's loan program, the government has increasingly used NGOs as alternative credit
conduits. At the same time, NGOs are regarded as informal institutions, and are hence not6
permitted to mobilize deposits. This bars them from engaging in financial intermediation and
becoming self-reliant, resulting in a loss of resource mobilization. This in turn is to be offset by
mandating banks to allocate 25% of their loanable funds to agriculture and 10% to small
enterprises: a piece of financial repression which places a heavy burden on the urban banking
industry and is unlikely to spur processes of self-sustained growth in banking services to the poor.
In fact, it might even prevent the further evolution of grassroots financial institutions owned and
managed by the poor.
However, it was also found that recent measures to liberalize the economic and financial policy
framework have created a basically favorable environment for microfinance. With interest rate
deregulation and a liberal bank entry and branching policy, there is ample room for the creation of
more MFIs and the expansion of their activities. At the same time, this policy environment might
eventually pose a serious threat to the survival of non-mature, social service-oriented credit
NGOs, which are already found to operate in a policy vacuum. The government's 111 preferential
credit programs, which have been criticized for being inefficient, over-politicized, uncoordinated
and unsustainable, are presently under review. The Department of Finance, together with the
National Credit Council, are in the process of rationalizing these programs, guided by principles
of sustainability and viability. It is not unlikely that a thorough reform of the government's credit
programs will have spill-over effects on the NGO credit world.
It is predicted that ultimately there might only be one option: the transformation of mature credit
NGOs into formal financial intermediaries. With reference to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh
and BancoSol in Bolivia, it is concluded that this strategy seems to be the only realistic approach
to the problems of lack of outreach, viability and sustainability. Furthermore, it is argued that
placing the NGOs in such a legal structure is the only guarantee that their mission for the poor
can be sustained and expanded on an ever-increasing scale. To implement this in the most
effective way in the service of the poor, it is recommended that the government provide an
appropriate supervisory and regulatory framework for MFIs based on the principle of self-
regulation. Donors may be invited to participate in the policy dialogue and eventually provide the
required support for the establishment of a self-regulatory authority at the second tier.
All this indicates that the government, inspired by brain trusts such as ACPC and PIDS it has
helped to support, is getting the message: in the long run only viable institutions will provide
sustainable financial services to all segments of the population including the poor. Given the
complexity of Filipino society and its formal and nonformal financial sectors, the implementation
of this recognition will present a major challenge for some time to come.7
2. Assessment of Grameen-type Microfinance Institutions
In the framework of this study, seven MFIs were selected, six of which make explicit use of the
Grameen technology in reaching the poor. The remaining one includes poor women as one of
several target groups. Six are credit NGOs; one is a cooperative rural bank with regular
cooperative as well as Grameen-type operations which has been singled out here for a more
detailed presentation.
· Ahon Sa Hirap, Inc. (ASHI): an MFI established in 1989 and incorporated in 1991; with an
equity capital of P2.5 million; serving 2,143 poor female beneficiaries organized in Grameen-
type small groups; with a volume of P3.5 million loans outstanding and P0.6 million savings
outstanding in 1995
 
· Alalay Sa Kaulanran Sa Gitnang Luzon, Inc. (ASKI): an MFI established and incorporated
in 1987; with an equity capital of P6.5 million; serving 1,552 poor clients, 85% of them
female; offering both group and individual loan services; with P13.2 million loans outstanding
and P1.6 million savings outstanding in 1995
 
· Center for Agriculture & Rural Development (CARD): a microfinance and training
institution established in 1992; with an equity capital of P7.5 million; with 3,980 poor
beneficiaries, 98% of them women, organized in groups of five; with P12.9 million loans
outstanding and P2.9 million savings outstanding
 
· Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc. (CRBLI): an MFI established as a cooperative
bank registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Bureau of Cooperative
Development in 1977. Operations started in 1978. Unlike NGOs it was given authority by the
central bank to provide financial services to the community and accept savings and time
deposits. Its equity capital amounts to P11.5 million, comprising P6.2 million in members'
equity and P5.3 million in retained earnings. It serves 2,583 savers, 81% of them women and
55% of them poor; and 1,792 borrowers, 90% of them women and 74% of them poor; with
P28.2 million loans outstanding and P5.6 million in savings deposits outstanding.
 
· Gerry Roxas Foundation Bangko Hublag (GRF): an MFI established in 1987 with an
equity capital of P0.2 million and registered with the central bank, providing loans to non-
bankable microentrepreneurs and mobilizing internal resources through a capital build-up or
savings scheme. Its equity and reserves in 1995 amounted to P3.9 million. As of end-1995 it
served 1,259 savers who are all poor, 84% of which are women; and 1198 borrowers, 73% of
them women and 85% of them poor. Loans outstanding amounted to P7.0 million and savings
outstanding to P0.7 million.
 
· Negros Women for Tomorrow Founcation, Inc. Project Dungganon (PD): an MFI
incorporated in 1986 to serve landless poor women in the depressed communities of Negros.
As of 1995 its equity and fund balance was negative at -P7.2 million. Its Grameen Bank
replication program started in 1989. It serves 9,216 clients who are all women and all poor. As8
of end-1995 there were 5,866 borrowers with active loan portfolios and 6,952 active savings
accounts. Loans outstanding amounted to P 8.0 million in 1995, savings outstanding to P3.3
million.
 
· Tulay Sa Pag-Unlad Inc. (TSPI): an MFI established in 1982 targeting the entrepreneurial
poor. Starting in 1984, TSPI initiated its Intermediary Lending Program, lending wholesale to
microentrepreneurs through 24 participating NGOs, cooperatives and community-based
groups. At the end of 1995 its equity and fund balance stood at P50.6 million. As of end-1995
TSPI served 3,119 individual borrowers who were all poor, 64% of them women, and 12
institutions. Loans outstanding amounted to P55.9 million, 96% of which were lent directly
and 4% wholesale through other institutions. Of the active loan portfolio of direct lending,
90% were lent to men and only 10% to women. TSPI serves a total number of 3,024 savers,
64% are women. Total savings outstanding as per December 1995 amounted to P4.8 million,
but only 18.5% were mobilized from women.
The Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc., has been singled out for a closer inspection, for
two reasons: (1) it is the only institution among the seven which is financial self-reliant and
viable, serving both poor and non-poor clients, but among them poor women as the large
majority; and (2) since 1991, it is a Grameen Bank replicator, thus combining regular and
Grameen-type operations. Does the Grameen approach enable an MFI to reach out to a poorer
clientele? And, in doing so, can it cover its costs or perhaps even make a profit? The answer to
the latter question is all the more interesting in face of the overwhelming evidence from NGOs in
the Philippines that Grameen-type banking is not viable.
The Bank was formally established in October 1977 by village-based cooperative farmers'
organizations in the province of Laguna led by the president of the Provincial Federation of
Samahang Nayon of Laguna. The required equity capital was contributed by the members of 90
participating farmers' organizations who decided to call the institution Bangko ng Magbubukid,
ie. Bank of Farmers. There are now 11 individuals and 124 farmers' cooperatives who own the
Bank. Its Board of Directors is comprised of eleven members, nine of them farmers and two
representatives of the Landbank and the Department of Agriculture, respectively, which own
preferred shares. As a manager, the Board has appointed the son of the founder. The Bank is
comprised of a head office with a staff of 17 and has no branches. Its operations are confined to
the province of Laguna which consists of 29 municipalities and one city.
Assisted by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) as the pilot-testing agency of the
Grameen Bank Replication Program in the Philippines, the Bank adapted the Grameen approach
in 1991 to extend its banking services to poor women without collateral. The scheme is called
Kaunlarang Pangkabuhayan Project (KPP)   Livelihood Development Project. Since 1994 the
Bank has employed a staff of five, one male and four female, specifically for KPP. The program
was supported by ACPC with a grant of P200,000 to subsidize the salaries of the field staff
during the first three years and by a grant of P2.0 million from local government in 1995. The
loan funds are generated by the Bank internally. For reasons of cost-effectiveness, the Bank has
not provided any technical assistance to the women-microentrepreneurs.9
2.1. Outreach
The seven MFIs have a total outreach of about 21,000 customers,
3 ranging from about 1,260 to
7,000 and averaging about 3,000 per MFI. The smallest has an outreach of about 1,300
customers, the largest of 7,000. About 90% of the customers of the MFIs are women. 94% of
them are poor. Two of the institutions target exclusively poor women. Five target exclusively the
poor. In all seven institutions women and the poor predominate among the savers and the
borrowers. There is no indication that any of these institutions will greatly increase their outreach
within the near future.
Table 2.1: Outreach of seven sample MFIs in the Philippines, 1995
MFI Savers Borrowers
No. % poor % female No. % poor % female
A 1,695 100 100 1,695 100 100
B 6,952 100 100 5,866 100 100
C 3,980 100 98 3,980 100  98
D 1,160  99 85 1,307 99 85
E*
4 1,415  55 81 1,330 74 90
F 1,941 100 64 1,993 100 64
G 1,958 100 84 764 85 73
Total loans outstanding as of 12/1995 amounted to P 128.7 million, savings outstanding only a
fraction thereof, namely P 17.6 million or 13.7%. There is wide variation between the seven
sample MFIs, ranging from P0.17 million to P4.83 million in savings balances (a ratio of 1:35)
and from  P3.48 million to P55.92 million in loans outstanding (a ratio of 1:62). Average savings
balances per saver ranged from P99 ($3.85) to P1,209 ($47) among the poor and from P2,826
($110) to P15,400 ($600); average loans outstanding ranged from P744 ($30) to P12,104 ($467)
among the poor and from P38,970 ($1500) to P66,545 ($2,600) among the non-poor.
                                                          
3  As there are no borrowers without a savings account but savers without active loan portfolios, the total number of
clients of an institution equals the number of savers.
4  E* = Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc., which has been singled out here for a more elaborate presentation.10
Table2.2: Savings and loans outstanding in 7 sample MFIs in the Philippines, 1995
(in million Pesos)
MFI Savings Loans Ratio of savings to loans (in %)
A 0.17 3.48 4.8
B 3.31 8.00 41.4
C 2.87 12.86 22.3
D 1.83 13.26 13.8
E* 3.89 28.25 13.8
F 4.83 55.92 8.6
G 0.73 6.97 10.4
Total 17.63 128.73 13.7
Poor only 15.84 112.25 14.1
Women only 11.75 60.82 19.3
Social preparation and client training in the use of credit are among the services offered by the
sample MFIs. Some charge a training and monitoring fee of 2% of the loan amount, while others
rely on government and donor funding. Given the narrow scope of products and outreach, the
problems associated with the quality and funding of client training as well as supervision and
impact evaluation appear as minor issues.
To increase outreach in a cost-effective and sustainable way, it is proposed to confine capacity-
building measures to existing viable and sustainable financial institutions which exist in the
Philippines in large numbers, such as rural banks, cooperative rural banks and credit cooperatives
with their nationwide network of unit banks and branches. Through appropriate forms of training
in microfinance technologies, these institutions may greatly enhance their services to the poor. In
contrast, investing in the creation of new branches of NGOs appears to be more costly and risky.
Instead, it is recommended to transform credit NGOs into formal financial institutions such as
private banks, finance companies, non-stock savings and loan associations or credit cooperatives.
In 1995, the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc. served 1,792 borrowers, down 5% from
the previous year, and 2,583 savers, down 31% from 1994. Between 1993 and 1995, the
percentage of the poor among the savers has increased from 40% to 55%, the percentage of
women from 77% to 81%. The share of women and the poor among borrowers is substantially
higher than among savers, but proportions have slightly decreased over the three-year period:
from 78% to 74% poor borrowers and from 92% to 90% women borrowers. It appears that the
Bank has reached the limits of its outreach, with a decline in the number of active borrowers and
savers over the past three years.11
Table 2.3: Outreach of the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc., 1995
MFI Savers Borrowers
No. % poor % female No. % poor % female
1993 3,893 40 77 1,842 78 92
1994 3,763 43 80 1,889 77 91
1995 2,583 55 81 1,792 74 90
The Bank offers two savings products: passbook savings of a minimum of P500 with a yield of
7% p.a. and time deposits ranging from 90-day to 730-day maturities with yields from 9% to 16%
p.a. While the number of savers has substantially dropped from 3,893 in 1993 to 2,583 in 1995,
the average amount has gone up during that time period by about 50%, namely from P1,011 to
P1,506. There has been no increase in nominal savings during that time period, but a substantial
drop in real terms.
Compared to the number of poor savers, the volume of savings mobilized from the poor has been
modest; however, its share has increased remarkably over the three-year period: from 4% of all
savings to 23%. The total amount of savings mobilized from women has slightly declined over
the three-year period: from 76% of 64%.
While the volume of the loans grew at an average of 19.5% p.a., it did so at a diminishing rate.
The average maturity was 180 days at an interest rate of 18% p.a.The bulk of the loans has been
given directly to individual borrowers.
While the vast majority of borrowers are poor, only a small proportion of the volume of the loan
portfolio goes to them, increasing from 4% in 1993 to 11% in 1995. The share of the women in
the volume of loans is not quite commensurate with their numbers, declining from 61% in 1993
to 57% in 1995.
Table 2.4: Savings and loans outstanding in the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc.,
1995 (in million Pesos)
Year Savings Loans Ratio of savings
to loans (in %)
Amount % poor % female Amount % poor % female
1993 3.94 4 76 19.83  4 61 19.9
1994 3.24 13 71 24.86 6 59 13.0
1995 3.89 23 64 28.25 11 57 13.8
In the field of credit, the Grameen program KPP has contributed to a very substantial increase in
outreach of the Bank: 1,330 or 74% of the Bank's 1,792 borrowers fall under KPP. Under the
influence of KPP, loans provided through savings groups have been increasing from 1% of total12
loans granted in 1993 to 15% in 1995. However, in terms of volume, the contribution of KPP
borrowers, P3.15 million, to the Bank's total loan portfolio of P28.25 million outstanding is
modest, comprising only 11%. Evidently, loans outstanding to poor women averaging P2,367 are
far below the Bank's overall average, which is P15,763 per borrower. There are wide
discrepancies in terms of average loans outstanding by sex and poverty status in 1995: the
average size of loans was P9,987 for women and P66,545 for men; P2,367 for the poor and
P54,327 for the non-poor.
In the field of outreach to savings depositors, the Grameen program KPP has more than doubled
the Bank's outreach. All of the KPP's 1,415 participants have deposited savings in the Bank,
compared to 1,168 non-KPP depositors. Thus, 55% of all depositors are KPP participants.
However, in terms of volume, their share is substantially lower, namely 23% of a total of P3.89
million, yet much higher than their credit share. This shows once again: the poor can save, and, in
particular: women are good savers!
The average size of savings in the bank was P1,506. Again, discrepancies exist, but they are by
far not as wide as in the field of credit: women saved on average P1,192, men saved P2,826. The
poor saved an average of P642, the non-poor P2,553.
Table 2.5: Savings and loans in the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc., KPP vs.
entire bank operation, 1995


























































There are three major sources of loanable funds in the seven sample MFIs: equity & grants,
borrowings and savings mobilized. Among these three sources, savings are least important. They
account for only 13.7% of loans outstanding. Savings mobilized from the poor account for 14.1%
of loans outstanding to the poor. Among women, savings are slightly more important, accounting
for 19.3 % of loans outstanding. (See table 2.2)13
The amount of savings deposits mobilized by the seven sample MFIs ranges from a minimum of
P0.17 million to a maximum P4.83 million   a ratio of 1:28. Two-thirds of the savings (67.6%) of
the savings are mobilized from women and one-third from men. The poor account for nine-tenths
(89.8%) of the savings mobilized. The most important source of loanable funds are equity and
grants which account for 58.5% of loans outstanding. The remainder is mobilized through
borrowings.
Table 2.6: Amount of savings outstanding in seven sample MFIs in the Philippines, 1995 (in
million Pesos)
MFI Female Male Total
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
A 0.17 0.08 0.17
B 3.31 0.21 3.31
C 2.79 1.40 2.87
D 1.40 0.15 4.00 0.06 1.83
E* 0.91 1.58 0.13 3.89
F 0.84 5.82 4.83
G 0.60 33.0% 0.73
Total 10.02 1.73 0.06 17.63
Percent 56.8% 9.8% 0.3% 99.9%
The single most important factor which undermines the sustainability of the sample MFIs is their
dependency on external resources. Most MFIs in the sample lack resources internally generated in
the form of equity capital and savings deposits. The MFIs have all attempted to mobilize
resources in various innovative ways but their informal character has hampered the effort. The
MFIs have thus failed to evolve into full-service institutions providing the poor with adequate
savings deposit facilities. In fact, the demand for savings services by the poor might outweigh
their demand for credit. In this context, the question needs to be raised whether poor people can
in fact be made better off with more indebtedness. Some, particularly those in marginal areas,
might be better off with improved savings deposit facilities and   perhaps self-organized
collection services.
Under the prevailing practices, the MFIs continue to be subsidy-dependent and donor-driven. As
donor funds are invariably short in supply, the institutions lack the potential of dynamic growth.
At the same time, the institutions find themselves compelled to devote some of their most
creative manpower to the acquisition of donor grants, donor reporting and other forms of donor
communication. It is also questionable whether under these circumstances participation in
national or international conferences, seminars and workshops is a learning experience or a waste
of precious time. It is concluded that grants and subsidies from government and donors have
stunted the growth of many credit NGOs into viable and sustainable financial intermediaries.14
It is recommended that in order to stay competitive and viable, the MFIs must raise substantial
deposits and develop various instruments, especially for the small savers, which will help to build
up their financial base. Both financial broadening and deepening are needed, comprising the
development of new product lines and services;  and the implementation of new microfinance
technologies and practices that strengthen their financial base.
The Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Ltd. has an active loan portfolio of P28.25 million as
per December 1995. Its major source of funds are equity capital and retained earnings amounting
to P11.5 million, ie. 41% of its loans outstanding. Savings deposits are a minor source of loanable
funds, equivalent to only 14% of loans outstanding (see table 2.4). In the KPP Grameen scheme
internal savings play a larger but still very restricted role, amounting to 29% of the loans
outstanding within the scheme.
Borrowings as of end-1995 amounted to P13.32 million, accounting for almost half (47%) of the
outstanding loan portfolio. Sources of refinance included the Landbank's Rediscounting Program
((53% of borrowings); the Cooperative Development Authority's lending facility (19% of
borrowings); the Micro Credit II Project (MCP) of the Department of Trade and Industry for
established microentrepreneurs and self-help groups (1% of borrowings); the Grains Production
Enhancement Program (GPEP) or Gintong Ani with input subsidies and agricultural support
services for rice and maize production (10% of borrowings); the Agricultural Credit Policy
Council (15% of borrowings); and local banks (2% of borrowings). With access to such a rich
source of external finance, the Bank appears to have little motivation to vigorously embark on the
cumbersome job of mobilizing savings from its members and the community.
2.3. Financial viability and sustainability
The overall evidence on the viability of the sample MFIs is conflicting. There are positive
indications, such as sound credit practices and response to market signals. Of crucial relevance is
the fact that none of the NGOs adheres to the creed of subsidized credit for the poor. In fact, they
lend at market-based interest rates, charging around 30% interest per annum, plus an up-front
service charge of about 1%. They are also aware that they should cover at least part of their
operating costs. Credit screening and loan appraisal techniques were found to be sound.
Collateral substitutes such as joint liability, peer pressure and pledged group savings were found
to be adequate, resulting in loan repayment rates in the order of 95%. Forced savings were used as
an emergency loan fund and at the same time as collateral. One MFI offers a rebate of 5% for
timely repayment and adds a penalty of 2% on past-due loans. At the same time, NGO banking
with the poor is expensive. Only one of the MFIs has a cost ratio per Peso of loan outstanding
below 0.20; four have ratios between 0.29 and 0.71; one has costs of one Peso for every Peso of
loan outstanding; and one MFI spends P 1.30 on every Peso outstanding. It is concluded that the
MFIs are generally inefficient and not cost-effective, with high management and overhead
expenses relative to the number of clients served and the volume of business generated. The only
exception in the sample is the cooperative rural bank, which was found efficient and cost-
effective.15
There are serious shortcomings in financial reporting and monitoring, which make it difficult to
calculate arrears ratios and to determine portfolio quality. What is lacking in particular is a
financial monitoring system that tracks arrears and loan delinquencies as they occur, and then use
them as an input into a management information system. Instead, repayment ratios and default
rates are calculated at the year's end. This was found to encourage laxity on the part of
management, which fails to take immediate remedial action on delinquency. The absence of
accounting and quality standards also makes it difficult to accurately measure the performance of
MIFs. This may turn out to be a major obstacle for donors or commercial banks who might
otherwise be willing to invest in promising MFIs. It is concluded that internal financial policies
and practices need a lot of improvement, particularly in the installation of sound financial
reporting and monitoring systems, portfolio management, assessment and management of risks,
product packaging and pricing, management of loan arrears and strategic business planning.
On the whole the MFIs are not operationally self-sufficient, and much less financially so. Their
delivery of financial services to the poor continues to be contingent upon the availability of grants
and concessional loans. If such funds dry up, it is feared that the survival of the MFIs is
endangered. Again, an exception in the sample is the cooperative rural bank, which does not
suffer from the constraints faced by the NGOs as nonformal financial institutions. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the most promising avenue of reversing the trend leading to their
financial collapse would be their transformation into a financial institution of appropriate legal
status, such as a cooperative rural bank, including the adoption of sound financial practices.
Table 2.7:Viability indicators of seven sample MFIs in the Philippines, 1995






A 1.30 21 19
B 1.00 8 7
C 0.71 51 42
D 0.48 67 48
E* 0.19 134 118
F 0.29 113 93
G 0.34 66 .
To make MFIs viable and self-sustained, it recommended: to build up their equity base through
capital infusion from existing owners and new investors; to diversify credit, savings and other
financial products in response to demand; to maximize savings mobilization opportunities; to
provide training in financial management, resource mobilization, portfolio management, risk
management, product packaging and pricing, and strategic business planning; and to improve
operating systems and procedures, including the institutionalization of performance standards, the
installation of a standardized accounting and reporting system, and the adoption of internal
auditing.16
Over the three-year period 1993-1995, the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc. has been
profitable, and so has its KPP Grameen replication scheme. During that period, the Bank's gross
earnings averaged about P5.7 million and its costs P4.2 Million, yielding an annual average net
income of over P1.4 million. Revenues increased at a slightly faster rate than expenses. While
loan interest charges were the principal source of income, earnings from service charges and other
receipts have become increasingly significant.
Salaries paid to personnel were the biggest expense item comprising about half of this total
expenses. 30% went to interest payments on borrowings mainly from other banks and
government agencies, comprising 1.5% of loans outstanding in 1993 and jumping to 5.2% in
1994 and 6.0% in 1995. Interest paid on deposits consisted of 6% of the Bank's expenses.
The Bank makes a profit from its KPP Grameen scheme, but at 6% of gross revenues and 7% of
net revenues only on a minimal scale. Salaries eat up more than half of the bank's aggregate
expenses for this activity.
Table 2.8: Revenues and costs in the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc., KPP vs.
entire bank operation, 1995 (in '000 Pesos)
KPP (Grameen) Entire bank operations
Total revenues
Interest on loans

























Net revenues 148 1,795
Costs calculated per Peso of total financial services (credit and savings) in 1995 were P0.17 for
the entire bank operations and P0.15 for the KPP Grameen scheme. In both cases there was a
slight increase in costs since 1993 by P0.01.
Total salaries spent for every Peso of financial services by the entire bank were P0.06. KPP
operations were slightly more personnel-intensive, costing P0.07. Total costs per average loan
outstanding were identical at P0.19.
With a debt-equity ratio of 1.64 in 1995 (substantially down from 2.59 in 1994), borrowings of
the bank appear adequately backed up by equity. The total income of the bank per Peso of loan
given out was an identical P0.26 for both the KPP Grameen and entire bank operations. However,
there is a substantial difference in magnitude and trend of net operating income over total
performing assets, which is 0.33% for the KPP Grameen scheme (down from 0.46% in 1993) and
0.56% for the entire bank operations (up from 0.39% in 1993).17
Table 2.9: Efficiency measures in the Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc., KPP vs.
entire bank operation, 1995 (amounts in '000 Pesos)
KPP (Grameen) Entire bank operations
Total costs 446 5,007
Average total financial services 2,976 30,334
Total costs per average total
financial services
0.15 0.17
Salaries as % of total fin. services 7.32% 6.03%
Ratio of salaries/total assets 6.57 5.97
Ratio of admin. costs/total assets 6.81 9.21
Total cost per av. loan 0.19 0.19
Dept-equity ratio 1.64
Return on performing assets 0.33% 0.56%
Gross return per P of loan outst'g 0.26 0.26
Default rates resulting from bankwide operations appear within manageable limits but could be
substantially improved. In the last three years, the ratio of past due loans to total loans
outstanding was steady at 17-18%. Collections on matured loans improved slightly from 85% to
89%. The recovery performance of the KPP Grameen scheme was substantially better, with a
repayment rate of 97% in 1995 (down from a high of 99% in 1993). The bank's earnings from
interest income and fees covers more than its costs, with a degree of operational self-sufficiency
(defined as the ratio of said earnings to total costs less depreciation) of 134% of the entire bank
operations as well as the KPP Grameen scheme.
Adjusting the costs by taking into account the costs of financial services and borrowings and
other costs, the proportion of the bank's interest earnings and fees are higher than the standard
ratio of 80%, though not much. With a yield of P0.87 (a slight increase over a ratio of 0.84 in
1993) in income for every Peso of adjusted cost, the bank as a whole is reasonably close to
financial self-sufficiency. In contrast, the KPP Grameen scheme, with a ratio of 1.18, has attained
more than full financial self-sufficiency to which the government has contributed with free
training and funding assistance.
Table 2.10: Degree of operational and full financial self-sufficiency in the Cooperative
Rural Bank of Laguna Inc., KPP vs. entire bank operation, 1995. (amounts in '000 Pesos)
KPP (Grameen) Entire bank operations
Total costs less depreciation 445 4,940
Interest rate to borrowers 25% 25%
Repayment rate 97% 89%18
Default rate  7% 18%
Interest and fees from clients 594 6,610
Degree of operational self-sufficiency 1.34 1.34
Cost of outside funds - 1,602
Savings for onlending 151 5,014
Bank lending rate + 2% 27% 27%
Depreciation & loan loss provision 64 219
Adjusted total costs 505 7,603
Degree of full financial self-sufficiency 1.18 0.87
2.4. Conclusion
The Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc. has demonstrated the profitability of microfinance
in two respects: both its own original operations with poor and non-poor members and its more
recent operations with very poor women under a Grameen-type replication scheme cover their
costs and yield a profit.
The Bank has faced three constraints: a limitation in outreach; a not quite satisfactory repayment
rate; and a weakness in savings mobilization. It has attempted to solve the first constraint by
adopting the KPP Grameen replication scheme which has more than doubled its outreach in terms
of numbers of clients. As the repayment rate in the KPP scheme has been far better than that of its
cooperative clients, this has also contributed to a solution of its second constraint, but given the
small size of the KPP loan portfolio only to an insignificant measure. Its management may also
feel that an overall repayment rate of 89% is an excellent performance compared to other
cooperatives in the country which have been undermined by traditions of preferential loan
channeling and unpenalized defaulting; and that it might be difficult in such a culture to do much
better. No solution is in sight for its third constraint, weak savings mobilization. This is due, on
the one hand, to zero or negative real returns on savings which could of course be remedied by
increasing the rates of interest on both savings and loans which is optional for any institution. On
the other hand, there seems to be little pressure on the bank to mobilize more savings as long as it
has access to governmental sources of easy money which are liberally replenished by
international donors.
In terms of most performance indicators, its Grameen-type scheme with poor women organized in
groups of five has been a success. Local outreach has been substantially increased; repayment
rates are high; and the Bank makes a profit from the operation. Yet, the Bank's management is not
enthusiastic. In quantitative terms, the volume of savings mobilized and loans disbursed to poor
women is only an insignificant share of the bank's overall business, and so is the volume of profit
derived from the KPP Grameen replication scheme. The management does not see enough
potential in this market segment of poor women to argue that in the long run the Bank will
contribute to the growth of their microenterprises and that these in turn will contribute to the19
growth of Bank. Such is perhaps not the logic of a cooperative bank   with a governance and
incentive structure quite different from a privately owned bank such as Bank Shinta Daya in
Indonesia. The management therefore considers terminating the KPP scheme which it finds
profitable in relative but not in absolute terms. As there are less than 1,500 participants in the
KPP scheme and the Bank seems to be close to its perceived limits of capacity, costly efforts of
convincing the management of its social mission may be difficult to justify.20
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